Russia’s assault on Ukraine has stimulated what can, for once, be called a “public conversation”. It’s in contrast to the usual unendurable hyenal screeching that comes with important public issues in Western democracies. Maybe it’s the nature of war which (too briefly) mutes the shrillness of the overabundance of quarter-wits.
Erudite and knowledgeable people share their views. Here. And here. What caused Russia to invade? What has the West done to contribute to Russia’s decision to do so? Who in the West is responsible? What will silence the guns? Assuming they go silent, how will two related peoples live next to one another? What should the West do in the future?
The starting point is the observers’ discomfited helplessness. Each explosion in Ukraine drives home the fact that smart people with words as their only weapon—right as they might be—have zero influence on decision-makers who long ago decided on blunt force to assert their narrative. Civilization remains at a disadvantage to thuggery.
Perspectives on this reality—often rejected by those convinced in the inevitability of human progress—correspond to the personal predisposition and life experience of the observer. That experience determines the amount of wishful thinking to be indulged and, correspondingly, the injustice to be tolerated.
Take the oft-heard view that Putin has made a “strategic mistake”. The invasion has backed Russia into a corner. It has united a fractious West, the opposite of what Putin has long strived for. Countries that previously were on the fence about NATO membership now are insisting on it as a guarantee of self-preservation. Putin blundered.
But that’s the projection of people who see the equation through their own eyes, not Putin’s. If his overarching aim is to consolidate—by force, if necessary—Little Russia, White Russia, and Russia, isn’t it more reasonable to believe that all other interests, including cooperative relationships with Western countries, are subordinate to that aim?
Were that not the case, Russia would have signaled a change in course as soon as it was excluded from SWIFT and fuel imports stopped, as soon as it saw that, this time, sanctions were of the non-anemic variety. Instead, and despite operational difficulties encountered by its military, Russia has increased its efforts to subjugate Ukraine by force.
There also is no evidence that anywhere near a majority objects to the invasion and Putin’s rationales for it. That’s not to denigrate the thousands of Russians—in a country of 144 million—brave enough to oppose their government publicly. But, as with most societies, the Russian majority accepts what its government does, calculating that opposition is worth neither bother nor cost.
Speculation about Putin’s misplaced expectation of a lightning war—quick replacement of Ukraine’s government with a Russian version—may be true. He wouldn’t be the first leader, though, who got assurances from his commanders of a (to borrow a phrase) “slam-dunk” victory. But he has done enough war (Chechnya, Syria) and likely knew better anyway and accepted the risk.
Yet does he not realize that it is ordinary Russians who’ll suffer the deprivation of enduring sanctions? That thousands of ordinary Russian families will have to bury sons (assuming they get news of the death)? Probably, but this does not dissuade him. In his relationship with his people, the narrative—the glory of a united Rus—offers legitimacy to him and salve to them.
What, then, is the “strategic mistake”? Even if trade relations with the West dry up, Russia will continue to do business in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, although a business not as easy, predictable, and profitable as with the West. Demand for Russian raw materials will endure.
For all we know, Putin has thought this through. What if the lack of Russia’s access to Western capital markets drives it to cooperate with countries like China, India, and Brazil to create an entirely different system, one that no longer depends on the West or even the US Dollar? Whatever it is he does, Putin will not be standing still in the face of sanctions.
To say that the invasion is a “strategic mistake” is an entirely Western perspective, one that assumes Russia and its people want the same thing as people of the West. For a minority that’s true. But the historical evidence—including what has happened since 1990—tells us, in general, that isn’t the case.
